Last week, amid the power struggle over the incurable economic crises of Iran and the fear of the people’s “tolerance” reaching its limit, a group of parliament members called for the impeachment of Abdolnaser Hemmati, the regime’s Minister of Economy, a move that turned into a new scandal in the factional infighting. MP Hamid Rasaee went as far as sayring on February 18: “Do not impeach Mr. Hemmati, prosecute him. That is the only way.” The next day, Ahmad Naderi, a member of the parliament’s presiding board, announced that 91 members had called for the impeachment of Abdolnaser Hemmati, and the impeachment session would be held on Sunday, March 2, 2025.
This sparked a new crisis that engulfed the desperate Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his president.
Hours after the announcement of Hemmati’s impeachment, regime president Masoud Pezeshkian rushed to the Ministry of Economy building, dragging the heads of the regime’s branches into the matter, saying: “All banking, currency, and monetary policies are decided in the meeting of the heads of the branches and have nothing to do with the Minister of Economy. If we are guilty, then we are guilty, come and arrest us” (ISNA, February 19, 2025).
Extinguishing the flames of this crisis was so important to the Iranian regime’s president that when his actions proved ineffective, he decided to bribe and appease opponents to prevent his minister’s impeachment.
On February 24, 2025, the state-run Hamshahri newspaper quoted Hossein Ali Haji Deligani, the initiator of Hemmati’s impeachment, as saying, “The CEOs of banks and heads of organizations affiliated with the Ministry of Economy have made every effort to entice those who are calling for the Minister of Economy’s impeachment to withdraw it. For example, while banks have stopped providing loans, they are contacting the representatives who are seeking impeachment, saying that they will pay any amount of loan and facilities they want to the projects they want and also to the people who visit their offices.” He added: “In one case, one of the organizations affiliated with the Ministry of Economy had invited 75 of the impeachment proponents, but only five of the impeachment proponents attended the organization’s meeting and handed over the gift that had been given to them by the organization to the supervisory bodies.”
During this session, MP Javad Nikbin, while referring to the crisis of rising prices and threatening Masoud Pezeshkian with impeachment, expanded the scope of the factional infighting. He said: “Mr. Pezeshkian, have you gone to the fruit and vegetable market? With this volume of inflation, can you afford to buy turnips? Can you put potatoes in front of your guests?… Change the course of your government, the course of your government will lead to questioning and impeaching you, change the course, otherwise the people’s representatives will change you.”
Meanwhile, the rival regime faction blamed the price hikes and economic crises on those who benefit from sanctions and those who have major interests in smuggling fuel and medicine. Ali Rabiei, the social advisor of Hassan Rouhani’s government, dragged the “domestic sanction makers” into the debate, saying in opposition to Hemmati’s impeachment: “We must impeach the policies that have not only not helped to solve the problems so far, but have always added to the volume of problems. We must impeach the people who have kept a society and a nation on the FATF blacklist. They should be impeached” (Etemad, February 22, 2025).
Khamenei’s meaningful silence in the conflict between the government and the Majlis (parliament), about the bitter harms of which he has repeatedly warned, shows that after the failure of his strategy in Syria and Lebanon, his ability to contain the internal crisis is diminishing and the dimensions of the crisis are expanding.