Analysis by PMOI/MEK
Iran, February 3, 2021—For many years, the Iranian regime’s propaganda tried to portray the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) as “an unpopular group.” But the main question is if the MEK is unpopular, why did the regime use a top diplomat to command a major terrorist operation to blow up a rally of MEK supporters in Villepinte near Paris in 2018.
For the regime in Tehran, the 2018 bomb plot against the ‘Free Iran Rally’ was a comprehensive operation. The regime aimed to blow up the rally, put the blame on the MEK itself by calling it a “false flag operation,” and eliminate its main opposition, at least for a while.
But mullahs’ wishes evaporated when its diplomat, Assadollah Assadi, was caught in Germany. The German police extradited Assadi to Belgium to stand trial along with three of his accomplices, a couple arrested in Belgium and a man arrested in France. With the prosecution of Assadollah Assadi, who served at the Iranian regime embassy in Vienna, the regime’s major investment in terrorism and demonizing activities against the MEK has failed. And now the regime cannot wind the clock back.
During his arrest on July 1, 2018, the German police found a ton of evidence that revealed much about Assadi’s plans and the Iranian regime’s modus operandi. In his car were found a black notebook with the bomb instructions and a 200-page green notebook that contained receipts showing Assadi had distributed a large amount of cash among various agents in Europe. He also carried more than 10,000 euros in cash as reward for the terrorist couple who were tasked with planting the bomb at the rally. He was on his way to meet them after they carried out the criminal deed.
Also, in another green booklet, the police found a total of 289 manuscript notes in Latin and Persian, which include the addresses of resorts, shops, hotels, and restaurants Assadi had visited. In each case, the time and date were mentioned. The information relates to 11 countries, including France, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, but about 144 notes are in particular related to locations in Germany.
During an online conference on January 28, former Italian Foreign Minister Guilio Terzi highlighted the need to further investigate Tehran’s terror network in Europe. “Only four people have been discovered. What about the other people on this network who remain in Europe? A considerable network of criminals is waiting for orders to carry out terrorist activities,” he said.
Also, over twenty former senior European officials issued a statement, initiated by Mr. Terzi, to criticize the EU’s response to the Iranian regime’s state-sponsored terrorism, underscoring the imperative of a firm approach to Tehran’s blackmail and hostage taking, and stressed that “appeasing this regime is feeding the crocodile.”
Three days before his arrest, Assadi handed over 500-grams TATP explosives in Luxembourg to Nasimeh Naami and Amir Saadouni, an Iranian-Belgian couple who were supposed to be the executioners of the plot against a rally of 100,000 people. Naami and Saadouni had posed as MEK supporters for several years and had used their dissident façade to get political asylum in Beligum.
Previously, in March 2018, they met with Assadi on a train in Vienna, where he gave them instructions for the bomb plot. Assadi told them that he has to go back to Tehran to ask permission and to test the explosives.
What is also very significant is the date of the car rental. An examination of Assadi’s passport reveals that he flew from Tehran to Vienna on March 28, 2018. On the same day, he rented a red Ford S-Max online. Assadi received permission to carry out the attack on March 28, 2018, in Tehran, on the same day he rented the red Ford S-Max.
On June 25, Assadi and his family started their five-day “touristic trip” from Vienna via Cochem to Luxembourg. The police observation team discovered that on June 28, Assadi, Naami, and Saadouni were in Luxembourg at least from 13:09 to 15:45. While Assadi denied having visited Luxembourg, his son Ali later told the police that his father was actually in Luxembourg to “meet an old acquaintance in and had a lunch with him for about an hour and a half.”
During police interrogations, Saadouni and Naami confessed that they met Assadi around 14:00 in a Pizza Hut branch in Luxembourg. On June 23, in an SMS message exchange in coded language, Assadi and Saadouni agreed to meet on June 28, at 14:00 in Luxembourg. The delivery of the explosives probably took place at around the same time.
Assadi’s trip from Vienna to Luxembourg from 25 June to July 1.
The original arrangement was for June 23, but this was postponed to June 28, 2018, due to Assadi's trip to Tehran from June 19, 2018 to June 22, 2018. Following their meeting in Luxembourg ,Assadi drove to Belgium to spend the night at an Ibis hotel in Liege.
Before crossing the Luxembourg-Belgium border, the police stopped Assadi’s car for a “routine check.” The control lasted from 16:00 to 16:42. But what is striking is that from 17:19 to 18:22 Assadi again takes a break for about an hour in a parking lot on the Belgian border. What is also noteworthy is that on June 28, 2018, between 17:09 and 17:12, Assadi tried to contact Saadouni. Assadi and Saadouni sent each other several messages between 17:13 and 18:17. A total of 29 SMS messages were exchanged.
The content of these messages is the code language and is in connection with the bombing plot against the rally on June 30, 2018, in Villepinte, Paris. At the beginning of the conversation, Assadi asks Saadouni whether he is OK and if "they" have moved. These questions are related to police surveillance in Luxembourg and Assadi feared that Saadouni and Naami might have been controlled too. Assadi tried to contact Saadouni and Naami to give them further instructions for dealing with any arrests.
Naami and Saadouni were supposed to meet with Assadi on July 1, 2018, in Cologne after the Free Iran Rally. Since the terrorist couple was arrested on June 30, 2018, on their way with the explosives to Paris, Assadi decided to wash his rented car two days before delivery while he still had another 900 kilometers to drive.
On June 30, 2018, and July 1, 2018, Assadi constantly searched online articles related to the Free Iran Rally in Villepinte with his IPad. At least 12 times he visited the Fars News Agency website between June 29, 2018, at 20:54 and July 1, 2018, at 08:46 to search for any news about the event. After finding no information about the bombing and receiving no confirmation from the couple he decided to wash his car and take a hasty route back.
Assadi’s claim that he was on a holiday trip to visit castles is not confirmed by the extracted information from his navigation devices. Most of the trips were long distances with short stops.
On July 1, Assadi and his family started their return trip to Vienna, from Gladbach at 10:20 and they only took a 20-minute stop in a highway parking lot. This shows that until his arrest in Spessart Süd parking lot, Assadi was taking a quick, purposeful, and accelerated return trip.
According to the German police, the whole “vacation trip” of Assadi and his family was nothing but a camouflaged trip to hand over the bomb to Saadouni and Naami in Luxembourg.
The hierarchy of the 2018 Villepinte bomb plot.
The Belgian security service concluded that the attack was on behalf of the Iranian regime and was not a personal initiative of Assadi.
This week Belgium’s VRT channel reported that in the last two years, while Assadi was in jail, he received several visitors coming from Iran, especially from Tehran. The Belgian intelligence has screened the visitors and came to the conclusion that not everybody can be linked to the Iranian foreign ministry. MEK spokesperson Shahin Gobadi told VRT that these are “key figures in the Iranian secret service, members of the division that runs the networks of spies abroad.”
A document from the Belgian intelligence agency – list of Assadi’s visitors from Tehran – their function in the regime’s Foreign Ministry remains unknown for Belgium.
The implication is that in his Belgian jail cell Assadi received visits from superiors, probably to receive instructions regarding his trial. During his questioning, the Iranian refused to make any statement, and the threatened Belgian investigators at one point. According to a Reuters report in October, Assadi had told Belgian authorities that his case was “being closely watched by undisclosed groups in Iran and neighbouring countries” and warned them about the consequences of “an unfavourable verdict.”
Gobadi identifies one of the visitors as Reza Lotfi, a key figure in the Iranian secret service. “He is responsible for the network of Iranian spies operating out of Iranian embassies. The close involvement of the Iranian foreign ministry shows that Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, is directly involved in terrorism.”
Therefore, the trial of regime’s top diplomat, who was also the highest responsible figure for its intelligence stations in Europe, is a major blow to Tehran’s terror machine. Despite all its chantage and attempts to blackmail Belgian authorities and justice, the regime failed in preventing Assadi's trial.
The Belgian prosecutors have demanded the maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for Assadi. They also demanded eighteen years for the couple and fifteen years Merhad Arefani, the fourth suspect involved in the plot. For the trio, the prosecutor demands their Belgian nationality be revoked. The court verdict is expected to be on February 4, at 09:00 in Antwerp.
