Recent revelations from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) have exposed a chilling evolution in the Iranian regime’s state-sponsored terrorism, confirming that it operates as a core instrument of state policy under the direct authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. A detailed report released in August 2025 unmasks a newly centralized command structure and a dangerous two-pronged strategy for executing attacks on foreign soil: using official diplomats for high-value targets while outsourcing assassinations to criminal gangs to maintain plausible deniability.
This is not the work of rogue elements but a meticulously planned state-run operation. The command structure for these plots flows directly from the top, with Khamenei personally approving major operations. The nerve center for this global campaign is a new entity within the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) named the “Qassem Soleimani Headquarters.” This headquarters, run by Deputy Intelligence Minister Seyyed Yahya Hosseiny Panjaki, now serves as the central hub coordinating terrorist plots between the MOIS, the IRGC, and its extraterritorial Quds Force.
Track 1: The ‘deniable’ threat – outsourcing terror to the criminal underworld
A key strategic shift identified in the NCRI’s report is the regime’s increasing reliance on international criminal syndicates to carry out its dirty work. By hiring foreign gangs, Tehran can create distance and plausible deniability, complicating efforts to hold the state accountable. This method was starkly illustrated in the assassination attempt against Professor Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a former Vice President of the European Parliament, in Madrid on November 9, 2023. Investigations revealed that a criminal gang known as the “Moroccan mafia” was hired to execute the attack, which was directed by Panjaki himself. This was not an isolated case. A similar model was employed for a foiled bomb plot targeting a PMOI Nowruz celebration in Albania in March 2018, where the regime recruited bombers from Turkish and Balkan criminal gangs to carry out the attack planned by the MOIS and Quds Force.
Track 2: The ‘official’ threat – abusing diplomatic cover for high-value targets
While outsourcing provides a layer of deniability, the regime has no qualms about using its own official diplomatic assets for operations it deems particularly sensitive. This demonstrates the seamless integration of terrorism within its state apparatus, including the Foreign Ministry. The foiled plot to bomb the NCRI’s Free Iran gathering in Paris in June 2018 is a prime example. For this high-stakes attack, the regime deployed one of its senior diplomats, Assadollah Assadi, who personally delivered the explosives. This pattern of diplomats-as-terrorists is further evidenced by the case of Gholamhossein Mohammadinia, Iran’s former ambassador to Albania. He was expelled from the country for his involvement in terrorist activities and is now on the FBI’s most-wanted list for his role in the abduction of former FBI agent Robert Levinson.
A policy of desperation demanding a firm response
This escalation and tactical evolution in the regime’s terrorism is not a sign of strength. Rather, it is a calculated response to growing internal instability and the weakening of its regional proxies. The expanding terrorist network is designed to project strength abroad to compensate for deep and growing vulnerabilities at home. Faced with this clear and present danger, the international community must act decisively. The NCRI report puts forward a set of essential countermeasures, calling for the immediate closure of all Iranian embassies, which serve as hubs for terror planning. It urges European nations to follow the United States in designating the MOIS and IRGC as terrorist entities, to prosecute and expel all known regime agents, and to hold the regime and its Supreme Leader accountable for decades of state-sponsored terrorism.