A few weeks ago, the parties engaged in the ongoing talks over the Iranian regime’s nuclear program were regularly talking about being very close to a final agreement, taking the final steps, a return to the nuclear deal being imminent, etc.
But in the past two weeks, optimism over a nuclear deal has fizzled, and according to news reports and statements made by the parties involved, the key point of tension is the removal of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) from the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).
The delisting of the IRGC has become a point of dispute not only between the parties involved in the nuclear talks, but also among regime officials and politicians in the U.S.
Why does Iran’s regime demands the delisting of the IRGC?
At first glance, the nuclear deal seems to be a simple equation. The regime dials down its nuclear activities and returns within the limits of the 2015 nuclear accord, and in exchange, the U.S. lifts all sanctions related to the regime’s nuclear activity. This was the original proposition that was being discussed in the talks.
But in recent months, reports indicated that the regime raised the stakes by requiring that the terrorist designation of the IRGC by the Trump administration in 2019 be lifted. As is evident, the terror designation of the IRGC is not related to the regime’s nuclear program, which makes it a tough sell as part of any agreement reached in Vienna.
So, why is the regime predicating any deal on the removal of the IRGC from the terror list? And why is it doing so while its officials are tying the revival of the country’s economy to the lifting of sanctions?
The reality is that the IRGC has a disproportionate share of all levers of power in Iran. It has a near-monopoly over Iran’s economy and trade. It controls the regime’s foreign policy through its network of diplomat terrorists and spies. Moreover, it has a large sway over other aspects of the regime’s policymaking. The cabinet of the regime’s current president, Ebrahim Raisi, is filled with IRGC veterans and the speaker of the Majlis (parliament) is a former IRGC commander. Therefore, the IRGC’s terrorist designation would cast a shadow on any benefit the regime gains from a potential deal with world powers.
Theoretically, the regime could find other ways to navigate these complexities caused by the IRGC’s terrorist status. It could reduce the IRGC’s leverage on the economy, diplomacy, and politics. But with the IRGC being the regime’s key pillar of survival, undermining its power and influence in any way would lead to the regime’s undoing. The IRGC’s pivotal role has become even more accentuated in recent years, as more and more IRGC commanders have found their way into key political and economic posts, not to mention its increasing role in cracking down on dissent at home.
This is why the delisting of the IRGC has become a red line for the regime and it is showing zero tolerance at even so much as hinting at the contrary.
For example, in a recent interview with the regime’s Channel One TV network, foreign minister Hossein Amirabdollahian said that senior IRGC officials “constantly remind the foreign ministry to do whatever is needed for the country’s benefit” and “if the agreement is in the country’s interests, then do not prioritize the issue of the IRGC.”
Amirabdollahian’s remarks were immediately met with a backlash from senior officials and politicians with close ties with regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Hossein Shariatmadari, the managing editor of Keyhan daily, accused Amirabdollahian of implying that IRGC officials have surrendered and called on IRGC commanders to clarify and correct the foreign minister’s remarks. And MP Ali Khezrian slammed Amirabdollahian’s remarks as being against national interests and causing a divide between the people and the IRGC.
On the other hand, speaking at the Doha Forum conference, Kamal Kharrazi, a close advisor to Khamenei, stressed that the Revolutionary Guards must be removed from the U.S. terrorist list.
Why is the White House having a tough time removing the IRGC from the FTO?
Meanwhile, in the U.S., politicians who have been pushing for the removal of the IRGC from the FTO are also having a tough time selling it at home and in the region.
The IRGC is the main body behind Tehran’s foreign terrorism and war mongering. In March, the IRGC carried out a missile attack against Erbil, Iraq. And its terrorist proxies are causing mayhem in the region. In the past months alone, the Houthis in Yemen, funded and backed by the IRGC, have carried out several drone and missile attacks against United Arabic Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
In the U.S., lawmakers from both sides of the aisle have expressed opposition to any agreement that would aggravate the IRGC’s terrorist activities in the region. Republican Senators have warned that any deal that does not have the approval of Congress will be dismantled by a future Republican administration.
Middle East countries are also concerned that the removal of the IRGC from the FTO will further cause insecurity on their soil as it will give the regime free rein to fund its terrorist proxies in their countries. They are now looking toward regional alliances and agreements to ensure their security should the U.S. proceed with giving Tehran such concessions.
And in the past few years, it has become evident that any agreement that focuses solely on the regime’s nuclear program and does not take into account its terrorist threat, ballistic missile program, and human rights abuses will only result in more insecurity and war.
American diplomats have tried to reassure politicians at home and abroad that they will continue to maintain a tough stance on the IRGC.
Speaking in Doha on March 27, US envoy Robert Malley said, “The IRGC will remain sanctioned under U.S. law.”
And during a visit to Israel, U.S. State Secretary Antony Blinken said, “Deal or no deal, we will continue to work together and with other partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region.”
At this point, the Vienna talks will depend on the West’s resolve to take a tough stance against the world’s number-one state sponsor of terrorism and its main terrorist arm, the IRGC. Although it is not clear whether the Tehran’s nuclear interlocutors will cave in and remove the IRGC from the FTO list, what is clear is that any deal that does not take a holistic approach toward the regime’s multitude threats will—like its predecessor—be short-lived and make the region less secure.
