The sheer corruption behind the Iranian regime’s parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections scheduled for March 1 is such that the regime’s own authorities and experts said on national television on January 27, “We have entered a quagmire where you are constantly creating restrictions on participation. For example, let’s assume that in the Assembly of Experts elections, how many candidates were qualified? 140-150 people. How many clerics do you have in your country? 150,000 to 200,000. What does this mean? It means that—among the clerics, not the population—you have failed to approve even 2-thousandths of the population.”
On January 28, the state-run Etemad newspaper, regarding the disqualification of rivals of Iranian regime president Ebrahim Raisi in South Khorasan, wrote, “The incident that happened today in the Assembly of Experts elections in South Khorasan is a complete symbol of the situation that elections are facing. This is the situation of all elections. Holding an election without a competitor has become a mockery in public opinion, as well as in international assessment and media.”
Regarding the disqualification of former regime president Hassan Rouhani, Rasoul Montajabnia, a former member of the Assembly of Experts, warned that disqualifying someone like him “has a very heavy cost for the system… and it has significant international consequences, leading to negative judgments from abroad.”
There is no doubt that regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei pays a heavy price for eliminating Rouhani. This cost goes far beyond what Es’haq Jahangiri, the first Vice President of Rouhani’s government, described as “overlooking the vibrant and competitive elections.” The main cost that Khamenei incurs is the total dismantlement of the façade of elections that he has been displaying every few years.
With the disqualification of Rouhani, the eight-year president of the regime, and his marginalization like the four previous presidents, it can be said that not even the hollow shell of the elections remains. This also extends to all symbols and pillars of governance, such as the presidency.
Some prominent members of the Khamenei’s faction congratulated each other on the disqualification of Rouhani. Regarding this elimination, politician Mohammad Hassan Ghadiri Abyaneh said, “the Guardian Council relieved the people of their concerns.” Although he apparently does not agree with Rouhani’s disqualification from the Assembly of Experts, he emphasizes that Rouhani “should be stripped of his position and prosecuted for his betrayals.”
To face the storm that awaits it, the regime has not found any solution other than consolidating power within Khamenei’s faction under the name of “purification,” and closing all fissures that could turn into cracks and break the dam in times of uprising. Khamenei’s need to handle his successor also amplifies his need to further contract the regime around his pure loyalists.
The fear of regime is not an illusory issue or a result of paranoia that dictators suffer from in their final stages, but rather a logical and strategic conclusion drawn from the nationwide uprisings of 2017, 2019, and 2022. Members of all regime factions also acknowledge that the next uprising will be inevitable and significantly more formidable, fiery, and organized than previous uprisings.
After the 2022 uprising, Khamenei has come to realize that the Iranian people are only contemplating the overthrow of this regime, and the time for showcasing elections has passed. Because as the people say, it is time for a revolution.
