Analysis by PMOI/MEK
Jan. 22, 2019 – On Thursday, the U.S. State Department called on Iranians to share their questions, wishes and remarks on the current situation in Iran and policy toward Iran on social media. Subsequently, Tehran’s intelligence apparatus frantically engaged in a campaign to spread misinformation and portray a false picture of the desires and opinions of the Iranian people. For the most part, the Iranian regime’s efforts were focused on demonizing the PMOI/MEK, which it sees as the main threat to its rule.
در آستانه چهلمین سالگرد انقلاب ۵۷ و در راستای تعامل مستقیم با #مردم_ایران، وزیر امور خارجه #پمپئو به پرسشهای شما در صفحات شبکه های اجتماعی USAdarFarsi پاسخ می دهد. پرسشها، امیدها و آرزوهایتان را برای آینده در زیر این پست بنویسید. #چهل_سال pic.twitter.com/WctW8oCMKo
— USA darFarsi (@USAdarFarsi) January 17, 2019
On the same day the State Department’s tweet was posted, the Iranian regime’s so-called “cyber army” posted thousands of tweets and comments against the PMOI/MEK, repeating debunked lies against the Iranian opposition. Investigations by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) showed that a considerable number of tweets were being posted from the Iranian regime’s troll factories in Mashhad, Tabriz, Yazd and Tehran.
The regime’s cyber army has pulled out old, well-known tactics from its playbook, trying to popularize hashtags that spread hatred against the MEK.
In order to hide their traces, Tehran’s agents use IP address hiding tools and try to introduce themselves as members of other Iranian opposition outfits. A large number of Iranian regime trolls pose as members of the “RESTART” movement, a supposed opposition group.
RESTART is founded and led by Mohammad Hosseini, a former anchor in the Iranian regime’s state-run TV broadcasting units. He later tied himself to the Green Movement that took shape in the aftermath of the rigged 2009 elections. It is a known fact the Iranian regime controlled and nurtured the highest ranks of the Green Movement, because it was never a danger and challenge to the mullahs’ rule.
Hosseini later made appearances in UAE, Cyprus, and finally in the U.S. In a 2013 interview with a Los Angeles-based TV channel, Hosseini explicitly stated that Iranian regime intelligence agents approached him while he was in the UAE and suggested that he launches a TV program. He described the agents’ behavior as “courteous.”
According to Hosseini, Iranian regime agents proposed that he would be able to run programs he likes and he would even be able to swear at Iranian officials to pretend distance from the regime. The intelligence agency would even pay for his expenses. But he also had to carry out other goals that the regime sets for him. One of the known tactics of the Iranian regime is to setup fake opposition groups to discredit and demonize the PMOI/MEK.
The Iranian regime is especially afraid of the growing influence of PMOI/MEK supporters on social media networks. This is a fact that various regime officials have admitted to in the past weeks. Tehran's latest efforts to defame the PMOI/MEK through fake social media accounts is just one facet of its propaganda efforts against the Iranian opposition.
The psychological and media warfare that the Iranian regime carries out against the Iranian opposition is one of the most extensive and well-funded parts of Tehran’s intelligence apparatus. In the past years, the regime has proceeded with creating false documentaries and hiring foreign journalists to spread fake news against the MEK. These efforts have intensified in the past year, and especially aimed at MEK members located in Albania.
In a recent story we explored the details of how the Iranian regime is taking advantage of the families of MEK members to spread misinformation about the organization.
But as protests continue across Iran and the Iranian people are becoming bolder in stating their demands for regime change in their country, the Iranian regime’s efforts to discredit its main opposition through the dissemination of falsehoods are becoming increasingly futile.
