On Monday, February 3, 2025, the heads of the three branches of the Iranian regime held their usual weekly meeting. However, this session was different from previous ones, both because, in addition to the three main leaders—Masoud Pezeshkian (President), Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i (Head of the Judiciary), and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Speaker of Parliament)—high-ranking officials from the government, judiciary, and parliament were also present, and because all three leaders, in their speeches, painted a picture of the regime’s deepening crisis and the explosive social atmosphere, expressing their fear of its consequences.
Pezeshkian said, “They keep saying that Iran has become weak and is in its worst state; that they can strike us. The enemy is trying to get some people to come to the streets with their rightful grievances and protest, while others are looking to exploit these grievances to create chaos in society. Any action that leads to public dissatisfaction and angers the people must be avoided. The current economic hardship and rising prices that are pressuring the people are unacceptable.”
Mohseni-Eje’i, the head of the judiciary, blamed the government for the current crisis while warning about the eruption of public anger and threats to the regime’s security. He stated, “If we do not resolve the economic problems and improve people’s livelihoods, these economic issues may prevent us from addressing cultural challenges, and even later, they could lead to greater security problems for us.”
Ghalibaf, the Speaker of the regime’s parliament, also shed crocodile tears for “the deprived and the oppressed, those who are being crushed under the weight of economic hardships today,” while warning about the consequences of the crisis and the danger of protests and uprisings. He stated, “This is a session where we cannot place the blame on someone else; everything good or bad that is happening today is under this very roof.”
In this meeting, mockingly named “Solidarity,” the heads of the three branches of the regime attempted to avoid open conflict. However, despite their efforts, the internal power struggles at the top of the regime could not be concealed.
Eje’i indirectly referenced the remarks of Javad Zarif, Pezeshkian’s Vice President for Strategic Affairs, at the Davos forum, which had escalated the infighting among regime factions to the point of street demonstrations by plainclothes security forces. He warned, “If we, the officials of this system, do something that, God forbid, makes people lose faith in the efficiency of the state, in the effectiveness of Islam, in the ability of this Islamic system to manage both their religious and worldly affairs, then our duty is extremely heavy. If, God forbid, Islam is defeated again today, we bear an immense responsibility.”
On the other hand, Pezeshkian, implicitly supporting Zarif—who is currently under heavy attack from a rival faction—protested and complained: “Some people have worked hard and made sacrifices for this revolution, but if they make one misstep or commit one mistake, we permanently push them out of the field of action.”
Ghalibaf also acknowledged the existence of internal disputes, saying, “Frankly, there may be differences of opinion, but for those of us sitting here, the Supreme Leader’s words must be the final say in all our discussions.” Ironically, however, every time regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei speaks, it only fuels further conflicts and infighting.
Eje’i, expressing his hopelessness over the relentless power struggle within the fractured regime, shattered any illusions of unity at the so-called “Solidarity” session. He stated, “Unfortunately, we have not been able to reach a common understanding… With a hundred percent disagreement, no matter how much we repeat calls for unity, in practice, it just does not happen.”