Reporting by PMOI/MEK
Iran, May 20, 2020—Two parallel events have risen in the political and social atmosphere of Iran over the past few days, and we witness the maturity of the battle between the two currents in Iranian society. The progress of both currents is directly related to the fate of the establishment of the mullahs' regime. In the past three weeks, the arrest of elite students because of their revolt against the has become one of the main highlights in Iran.
And in the past two days, much has been made about recent remarks made by regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who called for the assembly of a “young and Hezbollahi” government.
These two events must be seen as parallel to better understand their impact on each other and their effects and consequences on the direction of future developments in Iran.
The first aspect of examining these two important developments is that in his speech, Khamenei implicitly acknowledged why Iran’s elite students are rebelling against his regime and joining the growing movement of rejecting the mullahs’ rule in its entirety.
Khamenei’s insistence on the importance of a “young and Hezbollahi” government is further proof that these students have made the right choice. The events of the past few years have proven to Iranian students and the new young generations of Iran there is really no hope for a solution to Iran’s problems from within the regime.
This is transition that started with slogans such as "reformist, hardliners, the game is over" which were chanted in the December 2017-January 2018 uprisings. These slogans culminated into direct calls for regime change and the ouster of Khamenei in the November 2019 and January 2020 protest. And the recent arrest of student activists and the regime’s association of these political prisoners with the Iranian Resistance clearly shows that the desire for regime change has reached practical dimensions across the political and social landscape of Iran.
A few conclusions can be drawn:
The Iranian student community, which usually represents the political, social, and cultural aspirations of the younger generation, believes in the strategy of overthrowing the mullahs’ regime.
The regime’s leaders are realizing that there is no longer any desire for any faction of the establishment in the society, and the regime has to resolve this existential threat by further contracting its structure.
Another considerable point is the direction that the regime aims to take. Khamenei’s remarks about “young and Hezbollahi” government imply that he plans to dismantle the so-called reformist or centrist faction. This proves that Khamenei and the entire establishment have realized that the so-called reformism games, which the regime has long used as a ruse toward the Iranian public and its international counterparts, has run its course and is no longer valid.
It is unprecedented for the regime’s leadership to purge a power faction at a time that it is facing numerous domestic and international crises.
The conclusion is that the antagonism between the Iranian society (students, workers, teachers and other strata…) and the mullahs’ regime have reached a point of no return. This is highlighted by the fact that the elites of the society, people who could naturally have a comfortable future with wealth and life and normal progress, have come to the conclusion that there is no future for any progress in Iran while the mullahs rule in the country.
And Khamenei has reached the conclusion that the only way to extend his rule is to further contract his regime and move toward his proposed “young and Hezbollahi” government, where there’s not even a show of opposition or disagreement with the supreme leader.
What’s for sure is that the strategy of the Iranian Resistance has reached a decisive and crucial point. Future events and developments will further prove the fact that the Iranian elites who said "no" to the clerical regime have chosen the real answer of Iran.
