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The Trump Doctrine, in Theory

The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 18, 2017 – Donald Trump campaigned on an often radical revision of U.S. foreign policy, but his first year as President has been marked by more conventional policies than his opponents feared or his rhetoric advertised.
 On Monday the White House released a national security strategy with a similarly reassuring message—if it can follow through and implement it.
The most notable theme in the 68-page document is a welcome realism that the world is becoming more dangerous—and quickly.
The strategy identifies China and Russia by name as “revisionist powers” that seek to dominate their regions and “challenge American power, influence, and interests.” It identifies Iran and North Korea as rogue states that “are determined to destabilize regions.”
And it cites “transnational” threats like jihadists and criminal syndicates that pose cyber and terror risks. New technology “empowers and emboldens otherwise weak states” and poses new threats to the homeland and U.S. interests.
This may seem obvious as 2018 nears, but it’s an important corrective from the sunny assurances of the Obama years. Remember “the tide of war is receding”?
President Obama was so committed to his view that George W. Bush was the main source of world ills that he couldn’t admit that revanchist leaders filled the vacuum left by U.S. retreat. Mr. Obama left the White House doing little to stop China, Russia and Iran on the march.



The document puts these threats in their regional contexts and rightly notes that “regional balances that shift against the United States could combine to threaten our security.” Consider how Russia and Iran have teamed up in Syria, or how Russia and China have opposed more vigorous United Nations action against North Korea.
“The United States must marshal the will and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East,” the strategy says.
 “Sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners” that “magnify U.S. power and extend U.S. influence.” Folks at the Council on Foreign Relations might even applaud that embrace of alliances.
The strategy rejects what it calls the failed hope that inviting China and Russia into global forums would tie them to a rules-based Western order.
Instead it sees a return of the “great power competition” that predates the ideological competition of the 20th century.
This is hardly foreordained, especially if the U.S. reasserts itself on the global stage and rallies like-minded nations against the revisionists.
Toward that end, the strategy is forceful in describing the necessity of reviving U.S. economic and military strength. The Trump Administration is pursuing both with its tax and regulatory reform and a (so far modest) defense buildup.
The Trump strategy is especially notable for its candid assessment of Russia given Mr. Trump’s often friendly rhetoric about Vladimir Putin. “Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners,” the paper says. “Through modernized forms of subversive tactics, Russia interferes in the domestic political affairs of countries around the world.”
The strategy cites Russia’s attempt to destabilize Ukraine, but Mr. Trump has declined Ukraine’s repeated requests for lethal military aid to raise the cost of Russian intervention.
This is no different from Mr. Obama. Mr. Trump is also letting Russia and Iran dominate on the ground in post-Islamic State Syria. Mr. Trump’s anti-Iran rhetoric is more muscular than Mr. Obama’s, but his policy isn’t.
The document also says the Administration will “champion American values” around the world, including fair treatment for religious minorities and “the dignity of individuals.” Yet Trump officials have been reluctant for the most part to speak about these values in global forums.
Mr. Trump took the unusual step Monday of unveiling his strategy with a speech, but by now we know his foreign-policy instincts are personal and transactional.
He wants to do deals and charm his adversaries.
But the irony is that if he reads his own strategy document, he’ll learn why those adversaries can’t be charmed. A strategy of “principled realism” requires a realist with firm principles in the Oval Office.

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