On April 8, 2016, Germany’s federal prosecutor announced in a statement that it has filed charges against two Iranian regime’s intelligence paid hands for spying against the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) based on § 99 para. 1 no. 1 of the German penal code.
The statement stipulates that there is sufficient suspicion to establish that Maysam Panahi from January 2013 and Saeid Rahmani from August 2014 have been working for Iran’s secret service. Their mission was to obtain information on the PMOI and NCRI. In particular they passed on information on the members of PMOI in Germany or other EU countries to their interlocutors in this intelligence service. According to prosecutor’s statement, Panahi has been in detention since 28 October 2015. In the prosecutor’s statement of October 28 it is stated that Panahi received money from the Iranian intelligence (MOIS) in return for his espionage activities.
1. The Iranian Resistance announced in a statement on October 28: “Panahi and his accomplices” were expelled from Camp Liberty since April 2012. They subsequently went to Mohajer Hotel in Baghdad that is under Iranian regime’s MOIS and terrorist Qods Force control.
In Mohajer Hotel, a veteran MOIS agent and member of Qods Force (QF) by the name of Kiyanmehr with pseudonym Sajjad organized and briefed them on their mission. Prior, the NCRI Security and Anti-terrorism Committee had issued a statement on 26 February 2014 where it disclosed the role of Sajjad and the function of Mohajer Hotel as a center for regime’s MOIS and QF in Baghdad.
2. On the one hand these paid hands in Germany received their orders for espionage from Sajjad and on the other hand they were in contact with MOIS elements in Germany and other European countries. Head henchman Sajjad who made contact with these paid hands by facebook names Ali Shomali and Ali Saheli, has recently attempted to establish contact with several others in Germany for recruitment purposes using the names of Ali Chenarehi and Ali Rastgou.
3. Sajjad has been working with regime’s intelligence apparatuses from 30 years back and has been involved in terrorist operations in the region. It is many years now that he is busy conspiring against the PMOI while working at regime’s embassy in Baghdad, along with other MOIS and QF agents. They work at regime’s embassy under the supervision of QF Brigadier General Nasseri. Sajjad recruits those who go to Mohajer Hotel by threatening or luring them. Subsequently, MOIS dispatches them to Europe with fake passports and visas either directly from Baghdad or after they have been transferred to Iran.
4. Head henchman Sajjad also recruited Massoud Dalili Dakhel after he left Ashraf and went to Mohajer Hotel such that he became the guide for the force that assaulted Ashraf on September 1, 2013 where 52 PMOI members were killed with their hands tied behind their backs. To wipe off their traces after this great crime, the assaulting force killed Dalali as well and burned his face with acid so that he may not be recognized.
Sajjad controls and manages these paid hands in Europe as well and is in constant contact with those responsible for MOIS stations in Germany (Abbas Jafari) and in France (Ahmad Zarif with pseudonym Hamid Ebadi).
5. Following the disclosure of MOIS spies last October, MOIS compelled its paid hands to write numerous articles and letters for propaganda purposes and to impose pressure of the German judiciary to try to thwart referral of the agents’ files to court and the subsequent trapping of other MOIS paid hands. The websites affiliated with the MOIS and its paid hands ludicrously wrote that the arrest of Panahi is due to the enticement of “some factions and currents within the German security apparatus and judiciary” and it is “PMOI’s newest scheme” to “frighten other PMOI members”. They wrote to the German Federal Prosecutor that “the fictitious allegation of espionage and passing on of information to the regime and security threat” against Panahi is “fabricated by the PMOI” and that “he is one of the thousands of PMOI victims… They tag anyone even slightly opposing this organization as a MOIS paid hand”. This absurd rhetoric shows regime’s fear of the disclosure of its espionage network and paid hands and its conspiracies against the Iranian Resistance.
At the same time, the Iranian regime began collecting money through its paid hands in Germany and France to hire a lawyer for the uncovered spy to depict as if they have no financial link to the MOIS.
6. Germany’s intelligence services, especially the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, have numerously emphasized in the past that MOIS activities in Germany is focused on PMOI and NCRI. It has stated that MOIS has a systematic mandate to collect information on the activities of this organization and to infiltrate PMOI and NCRI.
MOIS tries to discredit PMOI and NCRI through propaganda activities. Acquiring information on PMOI members, especially members that have left Iraq for Europe, is a focal point of the espionage and surveillance activities of the Iranian regime.
The Iranian Resistance welcomes the fact that German prosecutor has brought the case of espionage targeting PMOI and NCRI to justice and calls on the German government and relevant officials to disclose and make public details of the case of espionage and illegal activities of the Iranian regime and its paid hands in Germany. This is an imperative step to prevent these criminal activities.
The Iranian Resistance also strongly warns of the perils of the presence of MOIS agents in European countries and the United States for the security of Iranian refugees. In particular it urges Germany and other EU member states to implement the April 1997 decision of the EU Council to try, punish and expel the intelligence agents and paid hands of the religious fascism ruling Iran.
Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran
April 9, 2016
